



Verification and Classification of Exploits for Node.js Vulnerabilities

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
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Student Research Competition



Video

1. Motivation




20 popular npm packages with 2 billion weekly downloads compromised in **supply chain attack**.
The Hacker News. (2025, September)

[ASE'25] DEBUN: **Detecting Bundled JavaScript Libraries** on Web using Property-Order Graphs

Seojin Kim*, **Sungmin Park***, and Jihyeok Park

• Next Step - Exploitability




```
const jq = require("jQuery");
jq('touch a;');
```

Proof-of-Concept (POC) Generation

3. Approach

```
let jq = require("jquery");
let stm = "payload";
jq.encode(stm, {});
```

Command-Injection found in **jQuery/index.js line 274** through **"payload"** input



• sink APIs and Objects

CWE-1321	Object.prototype, Object.{defineProperty, defineProperties}
CWE-78	child_process.{exec[Sync], spawn[Sync]}
CWE-94	global.eval, Function (constructor), vm.runInContext
CWE-1333	RegExp.{exec, test}, String.{match, replace}

• Incorrect PoC Types

target vulnerability
jQuery/index.js line 274

Type 1) A **different sink** within the **same library**

• ex) **jQuery/index.js line 112**, **jQuery/util.js line 78**

Type 2) A **different sink** in a **third-party library**

• ex) **lodash/set.js line 55**


Type 3) Intended result **occurs in PoC** without target sink

• ex) See Case Study

Type 4) No intended result, simple mistake

5. Case Study

Case 1) Intended result **occurs in PoC** without target sink



Case 2) Overly complex PoC generated by LLM

```
const dset = require("dset").dset;
const maliciousObject = {};
const pollutedKey = "a.b.c.d.e.f.g.h.i.j.k.l.m.n.o.p.q.r.s.t.u.v.w.x.y.z";
dset(maliciousObject, pollutedKey, {});
dset(
  maliciousObject.a.b.c.d.e.f.g.h.i.j.k.l.m.n.o.p.q.r.s.t.u.v.w.x.y.z.__proto__,
  "exploited",
  true
);
```

2. Background


• Prior Work - PoC Generation

- **Manual Dataset**
 - SecBench.js (ICSE'23)
- **Static Analysis**
 - FAST (SP'23), Explode.js (PLDI'25)
- **Dynamic Analysis**
 - NodeMedic (EuroS&P'23), NodeMedic-Fine (NDSS'25)
- **LLM**
 - PoCGen (arXiv)

• Vulnerability Categories

CWE-1321	Prototype-Pollution	Attacker input manipulates object prototype
CWE-78	Command-Injection	Attacker input executed as OS commands
CWE-94	Code-Injection	Attacker input executed as code
CWE-1333	ReDos	Attacker input cause excessive regex matching

• PoC example




• Problem

Validation limited to **intended results** at end of the execution

```
const alfred = require("alfred-workflow-nodejs");
alfred.utils.wfVars.remove(' "; touch a #',"value');
```

PoC (alfred-workflow-nodejs) - PoCGen



4. Evaluation

• Prototype-Pollution Exploits

	Type 1	Type 2	Type 3	Type 4	Invalid	Total
SecBench.js	0	4	4	3	11	194
Explode.js	18	0	0	0	18	83
PoCGen	14	1	2	2	19	148

- Assume SecBench.js, a manual dataset, as **ground truth**
- **11.29%** of exploits fail to match with their **target sink**

6. Future Work

